







Emergencies preparedness, response

Pneumonia of unknown cause - China

- Disease pultireak news
- 5 January 2020
- On 31 December 2019, the WHO China Country Office was informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology (unknown cause) detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China. As of 3 January 2020, a total of 44 patients with pneumonia of unknown etiology have been reported to WHO by the national authorities in China. Of the 44 cases reported, 11 are severely it, while the remaining 33 patients are in stable condition. According to media reports, the concerned market in Wuhan was closed on 1 January 2020 for environmental sanitation and disinfection.

The causal agent has not yet been identified or confirmed. On 1 January 2020, WHO requested further information from national authorities to assess the risk.

National authorities report that all patients are isolated and receiving treatment in Wuhan medical institutions. The clinical signs and symptoms are mainly fever, with a few patients having difficulty in breathing, and chest radiographs showing invasive lesions of both lungs.

According to the authorities, some patients were operating dealers or vendors in the Huanan Seafood market. Based on the preliminary information from the Chinese investigation team, no evidence of significant human-to-human transmission and no health care worker infections have been reported.



2019-nCoV believed to originate from seafood market in Wuhan. (Facebook photo)










The Wuhan Hygiene Emergency Response Team leaving the closed Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in the city of Wuhan, where the coronavirus outbreak is thought to have originated CREDIT: NOEL CELIS/AFP/GETTY




The outbreak began in Wuhan in eastern China




SARS 2003: deadly virus


774 deaths reported


November 2002 - July 2003





SARS: chain of transmission among guests at Hotel Metropole, Hong Kong, 21 February







Fear of SARS pervades everyday life in Hong Kong, one of the worst-affected places. Photo b



SARS scare: A newlywed couple kiss with

Photographer accused of staging SARS-period wedding shot

wedding shot (Beijing Today) Updated: 2004-04-14 10:42

The case involving Qiu Yan, who recently took third place in the World Press Photo (WPP) contest, was held on Monday in Wuhan, Hubei Province.





Hong Kong during the 2003 SARS epidemic


























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
About Us v

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

MERS Monthly Summary, November 2019

At the end of November 2019, a total of 2494 laboratory-confirmed cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), including 858 associated deaths (case-fatality rate: 34.4%) were reported globally; the majority of these cases were reported from Saudi Arabia (2102 cases, including 780 related deaths with a case-fatality rate of 37.1%).

MERS-CoV situation update from the Eastern Mediterranean Region [3]



2 494

Since September 2012, WHO has been notified of 2494 laboratory-confirmed cases of infection with MERS-CoV.

858

B58 MERS-CoV associated deaths have occurred since September 2012.


Since September 2012, 27 countries have reported cases of MERS-CoV

For more: Fact sheet on MERS-CoV.




Kenyataan Akhbar KPK 7 September 2018 – Makluman Situasi Terkini Mengenai Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) di Malaysia Selepas Kepulangan Jemaah Haji 1439H / 2018M

BY DC OF HEALTH ON SEPTEMBER 7, 2011







C O V I D - 19



Epidemiological insights

- At diagnosis: approximately 80% of cases are mild/moderate; 15% severe; 5% critical
- Disease progression: approximately 10-15% of mild/moderate cases become severe, and approximately 15-20% of severe cases become critical
- Average times:
 - from exposure to symptom onset is 5-6 days after infection
 - from symptoms to recovery for mild cases is 2 weeks
 - from symptoms to recovery for severe cases is 3-6 weeks
 - from symptoms onset to death is from 1 week (critical) to 2-8 weeks
- COVID-19 much less frequent in children than adults; and children tend to have milder disease









How long human coronaviruses stay on surfaces




- Surface disinfections with 0.1% sodium hypochlorite (diluted bleach) or 62–71% ethanol is effective within 1 minute
- COVID-19 was NOT included in this study but to date, there is no indication that SARS-CoV-2 behaves differently to other coronaviruses

Source: J.Hosp.Infect. 2020.01






Number of confirmed COVID-19 cases reported in the last seven days by country, territory or area, 28 May to 03 June 2020



Change in cumulative Covid-19 cases* compared to 1 week ago

| | | Total cases 1 | % change |
|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------|
| | Total cases | week ago | cases |
| (HC Globally | 6 287 771 | 5 488 825 | 15% |
| AMR | 2 949 455 | 2 495 924 | 18% |
| EUR | 2 191 614 | 2 061 828 | 6% |
| EMR | 552 497 | 449 590 | 23% |
| SEAR | 296 620 | 218 523 | 36% |
| WPR | 185 358 | 176 404 | 5% |
| AFR | 111 486 | 85 815 | 30% |
| USA | 1 798 330 | 1 634 010 | 10% |
| Brazil | 526 447 | 374 898 | 40% |
| Russian Federation | 432 277 | 370 680 | 17% |
| UK | 277 989 | 265 231 | 5% |
| Spain | 240 304 | 236 631 | 2% |
| Italy | 233 515 | 230 555 | 1% |
| India | 207 615 | 151 767 | 37% |
| Germany | 182 370 | 179 364 | 2% |
| Peru | 170 039 | 123 979 | 37% |
| Turkey | 165 555 | 158 762 | 4% |

Number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, by date of report and WHO 30 December 2019 through 03 June 2020







Covid-19 Situation in Southeast Asia


(data reported by 07 am IST 04 June 2020)


- 300 275 cases (and 8 350 deaths) reported by ten countries; +12 565 (4%) cases in last 24 hours
- 35 (97%) states/union territories have reported confirmed case in India
- All provinces have reported confirmed case in Indonesia
- All provinces/divisions have reported confirmed case in Bangladesh
- 68 (89%) provinces have reported confirmed case in Thailand
- DPRK has not reported any confirmed case




Number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, by date of report and WHO region 30 December 2019 through 03 June 2020








Cases reported per day for SEARO countries with >500 cases as of 02 Jun 10H



Cases reported per day for select WPRO countries with >500 cases as of 02 Jun 10H



Public health and social measures

Public health measures include personal protective measures (hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette), environmental measures, physical distancing measures, and travel-related measures. Physical distancing measures apply to individuals (e.g. isolation of cases and quarantine of contacts) or to communities, specific segments of the population, or to the population as whole. These measures are not mutually exclusive.

WHO recommends that all suspected cases be identified, tested, isolated and cared for, and their contacts identified, traced, and quarantined.³

Additional large scale public health and social measures (PHSM), including movement restrictions, closure of schools and businesses, geographical area quarantine, and international travel restrictions have been implemented by a number of countries. These are sometimes referred to as "lockdown" or "shutdown" measures.









Considerations in adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19

Interim guidance

16 April 2020



Background

Across the globe, countries have implemented a number of control measures to comprehensively prepare for and respond to COVID-19. The overarching goal of the WHO global COVID-19 response strategy¹ is for all countries to control the pandemic by slowing down transmission and reducing mortality associated with COVID-19, with the ultimate aim of reaching and maintaining a state of low-level or no transmission. Based on local epidemiology, some countries are in the process of scaling up public health and social measures, while others are or currently considering scaling

adjusting these measures, so as not to trigger a resurgence of COVID-19 cases and jeopardize the health of the population. Until specific and effective pharmaceutical interventions (e.g. therapies and vaccines) are available, countries may need to continue to loosen or reinstate measures throughout the pandemic.

Decisions to tighten or loosen or re-institute PHSM should be based on scientific evidence and real-world experience and take into account other critical factors, such as economic factors, security-related factors, human rights, food security, and public sentiment and adherence to measures.

Scenarios

WHO has previously defined four transmission scenarios to describe the dynamic of the epidemic: no reported cases (whether truly no cases or no detected cases), sporadic cases, clusters of cases, and community transmission.² A country or area can move from one transmission situation to another (in either direction) while experiencing different situations at subnational levels. Each transmission scenario requires a tailored control approach at the lowest administrative level.²

Although it is unknown how the pandemic will continue to evolve, three outcomes can be envisaged:

- complete interruption of human-to-human transmission;
- ii. recurring epidemic waves (large or small); and
- continuous low-level transmission.

Based on current evidence, the most plausible scenario may involve recurring epidemic waves interspersed with periods of low-level transmission. This guidance has been developed in the context of these scenarios and will be updated as knowledge of the dynamics of the pandemic evolves.

The risk assessment must address the following questions:

- 1. What is the likely impact of adjusting public health and social measures in terms of the risk of case resurgence?
- 2. Is the public health system able to identify, isolate, and care for cases and quarantine contacts?
- 3. Is the public health system able to rapidly detect a resurgence of cases?
- 4. Is the health care system able to absorb an extra patient load and provide medical care in case of resurgence?

-

The risk assessment should be based on the following indicators:

- Epidemiological factors: incidence of confirmed and probable COVID-19 cases; rate of hospitalizations and ICU admissions; number of deaths; percent positive among people tested; results of serological testing (providing availability of reliable assays).^a
- Health care capacities: health system (hospital and non-hospital) functions and capacity (admissions and discharges), health care workers, ICU and non-ICU bed capacity, triage at health care facilities, stocks of personal protective equipment, treatment of COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients according to national standards and crisis standards of care; health workforce.
- Public health capacities: rate of identification and testing of new suspected cases, isolation of new confirmed cases, identification and quarantine of contacts, number of public health rapid response teams to investigate suspect cases and clusters.
- 4. Availability of effective pharmaceutical interventions: Currently there are no COVID-19 specific therapeutics or vaccines. WHO, in collaboration with international partners, is implementing protocols for clinical trials to develop specific treatments and vaccines⁶ for COVID-19. The future availability of safe and effective pharmaceutical tools will be important in decision to implement or lift PHSM.

The adjusting of PHSM, including large-scale movement restrictions, needs to minimize the risk of a resurgence in COVID-19 cases:

- 1. COVID-19 transmission is controlled
- 2. Sufficient public health workforce and health system capacities are in place
- 3. Outbreak risks in **high-vulnerability settings** are minimized
- 4. Preventive measures are established in workplaces
- 5. Manage the risk of exporting and importing cases from communities with high risks of transmission
- 6. Communities are fully engaged

Considerations for public health and social measures in the workplace in the context of COVID-19

Annex to Considerations in adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19



Background

10 May 2020

In response to COVID-19, countries across the globe have implemented a range of public health and social measures, including movement restrictions, partial closure or closure of schools and businesses, quarantine in specific geographic areas and international travel restrictions. As the local epidemiology of the disease changes, countries will adjust (i.e. loosen or reinstate) these measures accordingly. As transmission intensity declines, some countries will begin to gradually re-open workplaces to maintain economic activity. This requires establishing protective measures, including directives and capacity to promote and enable standard COVID-19 prevention in terms of physical distancing, hand washing, respiratory etiquette and, potentially, thermal monitoring, as well as monitoring compliance with these measures.

On 16 April 2020, WHO published interim guidance that provides advice on adjusting PHSM, while managing the risk of resurgence of cases. A series of annexes was developed to help guide countries through adjusting various public health measures in different contexts. This annex is for those involved in developing policies and standard operating procedures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 in the workplace, including employers, workers and their representatives, labour unions and business associations, local public health and labour authorities, and occupational safety and health practitioners. This document offers

Workplace risk assessment

Low exposure risk

Medium exposure risk

High exposure risk

Preventive measures

- Hand hygiene
- Respiratory hygiene
- Physical distancing
- Reduce and manage work-related travels
- Regular environmental cleaning and disinfection
- Risk communication, training, and education
- Management of people with COVID-19 or their contacts

Specific measures for workplaces and jobs at medium risk

In addition to the above measures, for workplaces and jobs assessed to be at medium risk, the following measures should be put in place:

- Enhanced cleaning and disinfection of objects and surfaces that are touched regularly, including all shared rooms, surfaces, floors, bathrooms, and changing rooms;
- Where the physical distancing of at least 1 metre cannot be implemented in full in relation to a particular activity, workplaces should consider whether that activity needs to continue, and if so, take all the mitigating actions possible to reduce the risk of transmission between workers, clients or customers, contractors, and visitors; such as staggered activities, minimizing face-to-face and skin-to-skin contacts, placing workers to work side-by-side or facing away from each other rather than face-to-face, assign staff to the same shift teams to limit social interaction, installing plexiglass barriers at all points of regular interaction and cleaning them regularly;
- Enhanced hand hygiene regular hand washing with soap and water or use of alcohol-based hand rub, including before
 entering and after leaving enclosed machinery, vehicles, confined spaces, and before putting on and after taking off personal
 protective equipment;
- Provide personal protective equipment and training on its proper use e.g. masks, disposable gowns, disposable gloves or heavy-duty gloves that can be disinfected. Provide face or eye protection (medical mask, face shields, or goggles) during cleaning procedures that generate splashes (e.g. washing surfaces).
- Increased ventilation rate, through natural aeration or artificial ventilation, preferably without re-circulation of the air.

Specific measures for workplaces and jobs at high risk

In addition to the measures above, for high-risk work activities and jobs, the following measures should be implemented:

- Assess the possibility of suspending the activity;
- Adherence to hygiene before and after contact with any known or suspected case of COVID-19, before and after using PPE;
- Use of medical mask, disposable gown, gloves, and eye protection for workers who must work in the homes of people who
 are suspected or known to have COVID-19. Use the protective equipment when in contact with the sick person, or
 respiratory secretions, body fluids, and potentially contaminated waste;
- Training of workers in infection prevention and control practices and use of personal protective equipment;
- Avoid assigning tasks with high risk to workers who have pre-existing medical conditions, are pregnant, or older than 60 years of age.

Public health criteria to adjust public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19

Annex to Considerations in adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19

12 May 2020



Background

In response to COVID-19, countries around the globe have implemented several public health and social measures (PHSM), including large scale measures such as movement restrictions, closure of schools and businesses, geographical area quarantine, and international travel restrictions. As the local epidemiology of the disease changes, countries will adjust (loosen/reinstate) these measures accordingly. On 16 April 2020, WHO published interim guidance that provides advice on adjusting PHSM, while managing the risk of resurgence of cases. A series of annexes was developed to help guide countries through adjusting various public health measures in different contexts. This annex shows a pragmatic decision process for adapting PHSM based on epidemiological and public health criteria, and it should be read in conjunction with the interim guidance document.¹

The document presents only public health criteria, while other critical factors, such as economic factors, security-related factors, human rights, food security, and public sentiment, should also be considered.

This document is intended for national authorities and decision makers in countries that have introduced large scale PHSM and are



daddows > Batsa

Pengalaman Pertama Prof. Tjandra Yoga Puasa di India yang Tengah Lockdown

Puel Varmin - doubliness

Series, 27 Apr. 2020, 13.14 7600



Prof. Yuga di depan parteng Analy Ni Sane (Polis: bibrevier)



III Fakta-fakta Kobot Brutal Tembak

#2 China Tak Sonang India Batalkan Pesanan Alat Rapid Test Corona

> Rombongan Pomudik Kana Corona, Diketahul dari Komatian

Mondadak Korabatnya

Kopala Pria Bandung





How to use the criteria

The criteria are grouped into three domains that should be evaluated to address three main questions:

- Epidemiology Is the epidemic controlled? (Yes or No)
- Health system Is the health system able to cope with a resurgence of COVID-19 cases that may arise after adapting some measures? (Yes or No)
- Public Health Surveillance Is the public health surveillance system able to detect and manage the cases and their contacts, and identify a resurgence of cases? (Yes or No)

The criteria are not prescriptive, and it may not be feasible to answer some of them owing to lack of data, for instance. To the extent possible countries should focus on the criteria most relevant for them to inform decision making. The thresholds are indicative and may need to be revisited as further information about the epidemiology of COVID-19 becomes available. It is recommended to systematically assess the criteria at least weekly at a subnational administrative level when feasible.

Table 1. Epidemiological Criteria

| Epidemiological Criteria* | Explanation |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decline of at least 50% over a 3-week period since the latest peak and continuous decline in the observed incidence of confirmed and probable cases ° | This indicates a decline in transmission equivalent to a halving time of three weeks or less since the latest peak, when the testing strategy is maintained or strengthened to test a greater % of suspected cases. |
| Less than 5% of samples positive for COVID-19, at least for the last 2 weeks, ° assuming that surveillance for suspected cases is comprehensive | The % positive samples can be interpreted only with comprehensive surveillance and testing of suspect cases, in the order of 1/1000 population/week |

| Less than 5% of samples positive for COVID-19, at least for the last 2 weeks°, among influenza-like-illness (ILI) samples tested at sentinel surveillance sites | Through ILI sentinel surveillance, a low % of positive samples indicates low community transmission* |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| At least 80% of cases are from contact lists and can be linked to known clusters | This indicates that most transmission chains have been identified, offering the opportunity for follow-up. This may be limited by the fact that the information will certainly not have been collected at the height of the epidemic. |
| Decline in the number of deaths among confirmed and probable cases at least for the last 3 weeks ° | This will indicate, with an approximately 3-week lag-time, that the total number of cases is decreasing. If testing has decreased, then the number of deaths in probable cases will be more accurate. |
| Continuous decline in the number of hospitalization and ICU admissions of confirmed and probable cases at least for the last 2 weeks° | This indicates, with an approximately 1-week lag-time and providing that the criteria for hospitalization have not changed, a decline in the number of cases. |
| Decline in the age-stratified excess mortality due to pneumonia | When pneumonia cases cannot be systematically tested, a decline in the mortality of pneumonia would indirectly indicate a reduction in the excess mortality due to COVID-19. |

^{*} Trend evaluation requires that no changes occurred in testing or measurement strategy

^{° 2-}week period corresponds to the maximum incubation period and is the minimum period on which to assess changes in trends.

Table 2. Health system Criteria

| Explanation | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| This indicates that the health system has returned to a state where all conditions (staff, beds, drugs, equipment, etc.) are there to provide the same standard of care that existed before the crisis. | | | |
| | | This indicates that the system would be sustainable even if it had to absorb a surge in cases resulting from loosening public health and social measures. This includes sufficient staff, equipment, beds, etc. | |
| | | This indicates strong capacity for coordination, supervision and training on IPC activities, including in primary health facilities. | |
| This is for ensuring that all patients who come to a facility are assessed for COVID-19 in order to prevent health associated infections. | | | |
| The health system has sufficient capacity to isolate all patients with COVID-19 | | | |
| | | | |

Table 3. Public Health Surveillance Criteria

| Public Health Surveillance Criteria | Explanation | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Surveill | ance systems | |
| New cases can be identified, reported, and data included in epidemiological analysis within 24 hours | A surveillance system for COVID-19 is in place that is geographically comprehensive and covers all persons and communities at risk. Comprehensive surveillance includes surveillance at the community level, primary care level, in hospitals, and through sentinel surveillance sites for influenza and other respiratory diseases, where they exist. ⁵ | |
| Immediate reporting of probable and confirmed cases of COVID-19 is mandated within national notifiable disease with requirements | This indicates that appropriate public health policies are in place for immediate notification of cases of COVID-19 from all health facilities | |
| Enhanced surveillance is implemented in closed residential settings and for vulnerable groups | This indicates that public health authorities have identified populations who live in residential settings or are vulnerable and that enhanced surveillance is put in place for these populations. | |
| Mortality surveillance is conducted for COVID-19 related deaths in hospitals and in the community | This indicates the ability to rapidly and reliably track the number of deaths related to COVID-19. Where possible, medical certificate of death for COVID-19 deaths should be issued. Other approaches for mortality surveillance may be considered, such as reports from religious centres or burial sites. | |
| The total number of laboratory tests conducted for COVID-19 virus reported each day | Knowing the testing denominator can indicate the level of surveillance activity and the proportion of tests positive can indicate the intensity of transmission among symptomatic individuals. | |

| Case inv | estigation |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Public health rapid response teams are functional at all appropriate administrative levels | A measure of the capability to rapidly investigate cases and clusters of COVID-19.6 |
| 90% of suspect cases are isolated and confirmed/released within 48 hours of symptom onset | This indicates that investigation and isolation of new cases is sufficiently rapid to minimize the generation of secondary cases. |
| Contact | t tracing 7 |
| At least 80% of new cases have their close contacts traced and in quarantine within 72 hours of case confirmation | These indicate that the capacity to conduct contact tracing is sufficient for the number of cases and contacts. |
| At least 80% of contacts of new cases are monitored for 14 days | Contacts should be contacted each day during the 14-day period and ideally no more than two days should elapse without feedback from a contact. |
| Information and data management systems are in place to manage contact tracing and other related data | While contact tracing data can be managed on paper at a small scale, large-scale contact tracing can be supported by electronic tools such as the Go.Data contact tracing software. |



South-East Asia



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Local epidemiology should guide focused action in 'new normal' COVID-19 world

15 May 2020 | News release | SEARO

SEAR/PR/1732

New Delhi - Amid rising cases of COVID-19 and as countries in WHO South-East Asia Region ease lockdowns in a graded manner, WHO today said careful assessment of local epidemiology should guide future actions to combat the virus.

"Countries in the Region must continue to take evidence-informed action and conduct careful risk assessments while winding back public health and social measures. The focus should be on local epidemiology of COVID-19, to identify hot-spots and clusters, and the capacity of systems and responders to find, isolate and care for cases, and quarantine contacts," said Dr Poonam Khetrapal Singh, Regional Director, WHO South-East Asia.

Clinical management of COVID-19

Interim guidance 27 May 2020



Inilah cerita dokter Indonesia belebaran sendirian di India saat "lockdown"

Senin, 25 Mei 2020 16:58 WIB













REPUBLIKA co.id









Profesor Tjandra Yoga Lebaran Sendiri Saat Lockdown di India

KBRI New Delhi tidak mengadakan kegiatan apapun untuk para WNI di India.

Senin, 25 May 2020, 18:40 WIB



Rayakan Idul Fitri Sendirian di Tengah Lockdown



Prof Tjandra Yoga Aditama

16 hours ago




Cerita Dokter Indonesia Rayakan Lebaran di Tengah Lockdown India

Yoga tak bisa menyantap rendang kiriman dari Indonesia



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2. COVID-19 care pathway (see Appendix 1)



- A person enters the COVID-19 care pathway after s/he is screened, based on a standardized case definition, including assessment of symptoms, and meets criteria for a suspect case.
 - Suspect cases may be referred to as "persons or patients under investigation" (PUIs) in some contexts.
 - Probable cases are suspect cases for whom testing for SARS-CoV-2 is inconclusive or not available.
 - Confirmed cases are persons with laboratory confirmation of COVID-19.
- Discontinue transmission-based precautions (including isolation) and release from the COVID-19 care pathway as follows:
 - For symptomatic patients: 10 days after symptom onset, plus at least 3 days without symptoms (without fever and respiratory symptoms).
 - For asymptomatic patients: 10 days after test positive.

5. Laboratory diagnosis

For more details, refer to published WHO guidance on specimen collection, processing and laboratory testing and WHO Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for COVID-19 (66).



We recommend, for all suspect cases, collection of upper respiratory tract (URT) specimens (nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal) for testing by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and, where clinical suspicion remains and URT specimens are negative, to collect specimens from the lower respiratory tract (LRT) when readily available (expectorated sputum, or endotracheal aspirate/bronchoalveolar lavage in ventilated patient). In addition, testing for other respiratory viruses and bacteria should be considered when clinically indicated.



SARS-CoV-2 antibody tests are not recommended for diagnosis of current infection with COVID-19.

6. Management of mild COVID-19: symptomatic treatment

Patients with mild disease may present to an emergency unit, primary care/outpatient department, or be encountered during community outreach activities, such as home visits or by telemedicine.



We recommend that patients with suspected or confirmed mild COVID-19 be isolated to contain virus transmission according to the established COVID-19 care pathway. This can be done at a designated COVID-19 health facility, community facility or at home (self-isolation).



We recommend patients with mild COVID-19 be given symptomatic treatment such as antipyretics for fever and pain, adequate nutrition and appropriate rehydration.

7. Management of moderate COVID-19: pneumonia treatment

Patients with moderate disease may present to an emergency unit or primary care/outpatient department, or be encountered during community outreach activities, such as home visits or by telemedicine. See Table 2 for definition of pneumonia.



We recommend that patients with suspected or confirmed moderate COVID-19 (pneumonia) be isolated to contain virus transmission. Patients with moderate illness may not require emergency interventions or hospitalization; however, isolation is necessary for all suspect or confirmed cases.

- The location of isolation will depend on the established COVID-19 care pathway and can be done at a health facility, community facility or at home.
- The decision of location should be made on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the clinical presentation, requirement for supportive care, potential risk factors for severe disease, and conditions at home, including the presence of vulnerable persons in the household.
- For patients at high risk for deterioration, isolation in hospital is preferred.

8. Management of severe COVID-19: severe pneumonia treatment



All areas where severe patients may be cared for should be equipped with pulse oximeters, functioning oxygen systems and disposable, single-use, oxygen-delivering interfaces (nasal cannula, Venturi mask, and mask with reservoir bag).

Remark:

This includes areas in any part of health facilities, including emergency units, critical care units, primary care/outpatient clinics, as well as pre-hospital settings and ad hoc community facilities that may receive patients with severe COVID-19. See WHO Oxygen sources and distribution for COVID-19 treatment centres (78).



We recommend immediate administration of supplemental oxygen therapy to any patient with emergency signs and to any patient without emergency signs and SpO₂ < 90%.

12. Antivirals, immunomodulators and other adjunctive therapies for COVID-19



We recommend that the following drugs not be administered as treatment or prophylaxis for COVID-19, outside of the context of clinical trials:

- Chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine (+/- azithromycin), including but not limited to:
- Antivirals, including but not limited to:
 - Lopinavir/ritonavir
 - Remdesivir
 - Umifenovir
 - Favipiravir
- Immunomodulators, including but not limited to:
 - Tocilizumab
 - Interferon-β-1a
- Plasma therapy.



A COORDINATED GLOBAL RESEARCH ROADMAP:

2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS

MARCH 2020

There is brand comment on the result for recently for loops on actions that can new feet may, builture actions on that there affected see promptly diagnosed and receive optimal care, and catalyse the full integration of all innovations within such recessed, and.

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"Solidarity" clinical trial for COVID-19 treatments

"Solidarity II" global serologic study for COVID-19

Accelerating a safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine

COVID-19 technology access pool


WHO is bringing the world's scientists and global health the research and development process, and develop nespread of the coronavirus pandemic and help care for th

The R&D Blueprint has been activated to accelerate diag for this novel coronavirus.

The solidarity of all countries will be essential to ensure a products.

Global research database

WHO is gathering the latest international multilingual science COVID-19. The global literature cited in the WHO COVID (Monday through Friday) from searches of bibliographic addition of other expert-referred scientific articles. This d



Social stigma associated with the coronavirus disease (COVID-19)

About

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| Region | Number of countries/territories | Countries/States/Territories |
|--------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| WPRO | 21 | American Samoa, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Midway Islands, Nauru, Niue, Norfolk Island, Palau, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wake Island, Wallis and Futuna |
| SEARO | 1 | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| EURO | 1 | Turkmenistan |
| AFRO | 2 | Saint Helena, Western Sahara |

Countries/territories/areas with no new cases for >14 days: Saint Barthelemy (63 days), Anguilla (59 days), Seychelles (56 days), Saint Pierre and Miquelon (55 days), Dominica (52 days), Lao People's Democratic Republic (50 days), Montserrat (49 days), Belize (48 days), Eritrea (44 days), Fiji (42 days), Saint Kitts and Nevis (42 days), Papua New Guinea (40 days), Faroe Islands (39 days), Timor-Leste (39 days), Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (37 days), Liechtenstein (37 days), Turks and Caicos Islands (35 days), Guernsey (30 days), Antigua and Barbuda (29 days), Saint Lucia (28 days), Aruba (27 days), French Polynesia (27 days), Montenegro (27 days), Holy See (26 days), Brunei Darussalam (25 days), United Republic of Tanzania (25 days), Sint Maarten (19 days), British Virgin Islands (17 days)


• The COVID-19 pandemic has forced countries to make difficult choices about suspending some health services. Ensuring coordination and development of *new ways to deliver care while limiting visits to health facilities* is key to keeping people safe and ensuring health systems are not overburdened.

• It's vital that countries find innovative ways to ensure that essential services continue, even as they fight COVID-19.

• No one is safe, until everyone is safe. Now more than ever, we need national unity and global solidarity in ensuring that no one is left behind.

Previous outbreaks have demonstrated that when health systems are overwhelmed, mortality from preventable and treatable conditions can also increase dramatically.

During the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak, the increased number of deaths caused by measles, malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis attributable to health system failures exceeded deaths from Ebola.



P2P di era COVID

NTD

- Leprosy in the context of COVID-19
- - Memo from HQ on NTD & COVID-19

IVD

- - FAQs on providing immunization services during COVID-19 (pre-published)
- Guiding principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19 pandemic
- - Immunization in the context of COVID-19 FAQs

AMR

COVID-19 and AMR – what do we know so far?







LOMBA FOTOGRAFI PEKAN IMUNISASI DUNIA 2020



PHOTO APRESIASI TERBAIK



MANTAN DIRJEN PZP DAN SEKARANG DIREKTUR PENYAKIT MENULAR WHO SEARO SEJAK MAHASIWA SUDAH "TURUN LANGSUNG" MELAKUKAN IMUNISASI

P2P di era COVID

TB

- Continuity of TB services in South-East Asia Region during the Covid-19 outbreak
- - COVID-19: Considerations for tuberculosis (TB) care

HIV

- Advisory on HIV services during times of COVID-19 Pandemic
- COVID-19 and Continuity of HIV-related Services in WHO South-East Asia Region
- - COVID-19 and HIV: Current key issues and actions



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COVID-19 significantly impacts health services for noncommunicable diseases



















Media Contacts

1 June 2020 | News release

- Prevention and treatment services for noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) have been severely disrupted since the COVID-19 pandemic began, according to a WHO survey released today. The survey, which was completed by 155 countries during a 3-week period in May, confirmed that the impact is global, but that low-income countries are most affected.
- This situation is of significant concern because people living with NCDs are at higher risk of severe COVID-19-related illness and death.
- "The results of this survey confirm what we have been hearing from countries for a number of weeks now," said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization. "Many people who need treatment for diseases like cancer, cardiovascular disease and diabetes have not been receiving the health services and medicines they need since the COVID-19 pandemic began. It's vital that countries find innovative ways to ensure that essential services for NCDs continue, even as they fight COVID-19."

- Early serological studies show that *most of the population is still susceptible to COVID-19*. Until there is a vaccine, the comprehensive package of measures is our most effective set of tools to tackle the virus.
- The downward trend in the disease observed in some countries is due to public health measures put in place by the countries to break chains of transmission in communities and we hope we can maintain low levels of transmission over time.
- Without proper safeguards and monitoring, there is the real *threat of resurgence* of COVID-19 in countries that are now seeing a decrease in the number of cases.
- The risk of returning to lockdown remains very real if countries do not manage the transition *extremely carefully, and in a phased approach*.
- The pandemic illustrates why investing in health must be at the centre of development. Health is a necessity and a pathway to security, prosperity and peace.





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English


Français

Русский

Españo

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Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic



WHO Academy Health workers need accurate, extensive, reliable, and timely information on COVID-19 to save lives and stay safe.


This app provides health workers everywhere with an efficient way to access the World Health Organization's C...

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WHO Academy

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






Updated news on the COVID-19





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Dhayavad